Starting from the century of Polish women’s movement, and the LGBTQ politics to Polish art in London and Brexit.

Dr Urszula Chowaniec, Senior Teaching Fellow in Polish Language (Impacts of Gender Discourse Series)

Emancipation now seems to be in a backlash. In October, Polish women again demonstrated  to commemorate October 2016, when the whole of Poland was dressed in black; when thousands of Polish women and men demonstrated against a proposal to radicalize already one of the most radical abortion laws in Europe. This was also part of the London story; many Polish women also honoured October 2016 a few weeks ago in front of Polish Embassy. The story of women’s emancipation, gender politics and migration was a leading theme of many SSEES’ seminars and talks. Let’s recall some facts….

When I start my Polish classes, I ask my students about any Polish people; Copernicus, Fryderyk Chopin, Lech Wałęsa… Women hardly ever appear in the list, so I mention, usually to my students’ surprise, Marie Curie. (more…)

On 9th June 2016, SSEES hosted a debate on Brexit. We were lucky enough to have Liam Halligan of the Telegraph as our chair for proceedings.

Our panel of experts consisted of: SSEES Director Professor Jan Kubik, Pro-Vice Provost and Professor of Slavonic and East European Studies; Professor Anne White, Professor of Polish Studies and Social and Political Science; Dr Felix Ciuta, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Professor Martyn Rady, Masaryk Professor of Central European History.

We would like to invite our readers to relive the engaging and lively debate below. Let us know what you think in the comments – are you voting In or Out?

 

 

Please note: All views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of UCL, SSEES or UCL SSEES Research Blog.

We are proud to include a series of Guest Blogs by some of our top students at SSEES as part of our Brexit series. This post is by a group of outstanding First and Second-year Undergraduates, who were put forward by Filipa Figueira and Imogen Wade. 

The authors of this piece are: Zainab Al-Ansari, Pearl Ahrens, Grace Garry, Anne-Caroline Gauter, Jessica Longley, David Zivkovic

“Europe is my continent, not my country”. These words pronounced by John Redwood, a Conservative Party politician summarises well the ambiguous relationship  between Britain and the European Union. This particular link has reached a new point: UK is currently debating over a hypothetical exit. David Cameron promised a referendum on June 23rd 2016, one of his campaign promises, orchestrated to compete with the sudden rise of the UKIP.

 

The European institutions clearly do not want to see the UK leaving EU and made concessions to keep its “awkward” but powerful “partner” in the union, helping to shape a “Europe à la carte.”

We will focus on three main dimensions of Brexit. The first part will be devoted to the political area. The second part, economical, studying the consequences on commercial exchanges for United Kingdom. The last part approaches a social perspective on the issue, including immigration, and the UK’s identity with regards to the EU.

David – “Leaving the EU would undoubtedly facilitate policy-making in the UK – UK institutions can make policies autonomously, without any foreign institutions being able to annul them. Brexit could also be beneficial for democracy within the UK. If we consider the plummeting voting turnouts,  both in the UK and the whole of Europe, we could say that getting rid of some elections and institutions that people do not really care about (such as EU institutions and regulations that hardly anyone seems to understand in their entirety) could inhibit the increase in political apathy, if not even increase popular engagement with national matters.

“David Cameron “fought out” special concessions for the EU. But would such concessions not simply create an even wider gap between the UK and continental Europe? More autonomy means less representation on EU level. If the UK wants to decide on its own on a certain matter, it cannot decide what the other EU members will do, which weakens the relationship between the UK and the EU. So rather than avoiding Brexit, Cameron would appear to be postponing it. Also, other member states could think: “If the UK can do it, why shouldn’t we demand something similar?” Given this, together with a pessimistic attitude towards the EU being a trend – Italian Prime Minister Renzi even referred to the EU as “the orchestra playing on the Titanic” – it might be more beneficial for Britain to take advantage of an emergency boat on this “ship” and opt for Brexit.”

 

Grace – “However, Brexit could trigger the disintegration of the EU, creating a domino effect resulting in other states leaving.

“The success of Brexit also still relies on the continued existence of the EU for the UK to make deals and agreements with. Thus the disintegration of the EU would mean the end of any sense of unity among the European nations in international affairs, security and trade. With the increasing unification of EU foreign and security policy in order to add power to its voice in the international community, it is clear how Brexit would put the UK at a disadvantage internationally, with significantly less influence pursuing its policies alone.

“This follows the federalist idea of economies of scale which suggests that something is more efficient if done by everyone together rather than separately. Currently the UK has a voice and influence within the EU, which would not be possible with Brexit. The federalist idea of externalities implies that the actions from one group have indirect effects on others. If Brexit occurred the UK’s close proximity to Europe mean it would not be free from the indirect effect of EU policy actions. Thus it may be better to remain within the EU and help form and influence laws than to leave but still be affected by its decisions.”

 

Jessica – “If the UK does decide to leave the EU, it would not only affect the country’s political power, but also its economy. None of the top 100 leading thinkers in the world consider that the UK would benefit from leaving. One of the main reasons behind this is the belief that Brexit will bring economic uncertainty and adverse shock to the UK. Indeed, the new trade rules are yet to be defined and depends on how exactly the UK will leave the EU.

“Moreover, the EU would have a strong incentive to impose a harsh settlement to discourage other countries from leaving. The UK would find itself still constrained by rules it would have no role in formulating, leaving the UK on the sidelines, as a powerless sovereignty. Some argue this would have a massive impact on UK’s growth as it depends on the EU for more than half of its exports. Leaving the EU would mean that the UK would be losing their access to the biggest economy in the world and their most important trade partner.

On the other hand, others believe that the impacts of Brexit on trade would be relatively small. They expect that a favourable trade agreement would be reached after Brexit as there are advantages for both sides in continuing a close commercial arrangement. Furthermore, they argue that leaving would permit the UK to trade more successfully, stating that the benefits the EU provide are smaller than a few decades ago. Having gained more influence, the UK could get a seat back on big international bodies that the EU took away and create new free trade agreements. Lastly, the UK would not have to pay £10 billion into Brussels for other countries on the continent. This would cut the balance deficit by 1/5 in the first year after leaving, meaning Britain could spend it on its priorities, leading to an economic boost.

 

Zainab – “Could Brexit harm our jobs? British companies that are dependent on trade with the EU could see their production costs rise after an exit forcing them to let go of workers in order to cut costs and hold on to their profit margins.

“Rolls-Royce Motor Cars is an example of a British company directly affected. RR believes that exit from the European Union could “drive up costs and have an impact on its workforce” as most of the company’s trade is done with the EU. Earlier this month, the luxury motor car company wrote to its employees, warning of the adverse effects of Brexit.

“However, others see that EU laws undermine the flexibility of our nation’s labor market and increase the costs associated with hiring staff. This increases production costs and makes firms less likely to hire too many workers. Indeed, a Brexit under a Conservative government could potentially see the repeal of the maximum 48-hour working week and the removal of working time record keeping requirements, allowing firms to save money in the production process and possibly take on more workers.

“The current free movement of labor affects British workers’ job prospects. British firms are more likely to employ an EU worker than a British one because of their higher rates of productivity. EU workers are able to work greater hours and are more accepting of minimum wage. “Vote Leave” advocate, MP Iain Duncan Smith, says ‘for every 100 migrants employed, 23 UK-born workers would have been displaced’ across industries including education, secretarial and janitorial work. The removal of Britain from the EU would force British firms to employ British workers and therefore improve domestic employment levels.

“However, there is no statistical proof of the impact of EU migrants specifically to substantiate what Iain Duncan Smith claims.”

Pearl – “Immigration and identity are both key considerations in the Brexit topic. Douglas Carswell, UKIP’s only MP, and Leave.EU, agree that although there are a repertoire of reasons to leave the EU, immigration is the strongest. Carswell says, using the persuasive tactic of risk, that “the safest thing we can do is vote to take back control.” The UK currently has 2.48 EU immigrants per 1000 British citizens, therefore a large portion of the Brexit campaign claim it’s necessary that dangerous and rampant immigration is reduced and from a solitary stance Britain can control its own borders. However, there are 3 arguments which the campaign to remain is using to bat back.

 

“Firstly, leaving the EU doesn’t guarantee fewer immigrants. Switzerland and Norway aren’t in the EU yet they have 11.33 and 7.38 EU immigrants per 1000 citizens respectively. If Brexit occurred it is unclear what relationship the UK would share with its EU neighbours, but it’s possible it would follow the examples set by Switzerland and Norway. There, trade agreements are locked to freedom of movement agreements; the UK wouldn’t be able to have one without the other.

“Secondly, there is still hope of renegotiation of Britain’s position within the EU. Cameron’s negotiations so far have not been promising but there is flexibility in domestic law, for instance EU immigrants currently cannot claim housing benefit (NI Direct, 2014). Cameron’s current proposals include stopping EU immigrants being able to receive benefits for the first four years they are working in the UK. He bills this as a kind of punishment for the immigrants already “putting an excessive pressure on the proper functioning of its public services.” This confounds the argument that it’s only possible to deter immigrants from entering the UK if we leave the EU.

“Thirdly, some campaigners on the left argue that it’s inhumane to keep EU immigrants out of Britain while it remains one of the richest countries in the world. They emphasise the scale of the refugee crisis and the impact this has relating to externalities. They also highlight the UK’s recent history of “hypocritically pressuring Turkey to open its borders whilst fortifying our own.”

“Arguments for the UK to remain come from all over the political spectrum, and a consensus has not been reached on how best to discuss immigration in the context of Brexit.”

 

Anne – Caroline – “Another social aspect highlighted by the Brexit would be the “European identity”. This identity is a complex question, as it is made of several ones, each from its own country.

“The EU was initially an economic partnership created after WWII to maintain peace and help reconstruction. The main goal was to promote exchanges between the countries and to strengthen the ties between them. Then, politicians tried to extend this partnership with a political and cultural dimension. However, even if the countries share some common historical background- we can refer for instance to the Roman Empire, Hellenistic civilisation, Christianism or the Enlightenment during the 18th century- there is not a strong feeling of belonging to a same community.

“Britain was shaped by a “Eurosceptic culture”. It is rather a global country, as Anthony Eden said in 1952, “her interests lie far beyond the continent of Europe”. The British were also known for their pragmatic policies and did not believe in a European union in the first place; it was seen as contradictory with their sovereignty and against their liberty. Margaret Thatcher strengthened this tradition.

 

These elements can explain the origin of the current Euroscepticism in UK. In other words, there is a lack of legitimacy concerning the EU. The weak political legitimacy occurring in the EU is due to the incapacity of political structures to solve new issues brought by globalization and European integration.

“A recent survey by Natcen emphasises the fact that British people have never felt to “belong to a European Identity”. In 2014, 15% thought themselves as European, that is 5% more than in 1996. The highest figure was achieved in 1999, with 17%. Therefore, those low cultural links do not really bond British people with the other members of the union: withdrawing from the EU will not make a big difference for them.

“Another social aspect that goes in the sense of leaving the EU would be the feeling of being “in security”. This would be illustrated by closing the borders. According to a survey realized on the 15th and 16th January, 53% of people were in favour of the Brexit. The main reason of this decision was the recent set of attacks that struck the French capital.  In addition, we can cite the mass sexual assaults that took place in Cologne on New Years Eve 2015.”

 

In conclusion, there are many issues to consider relating to Brexit, with convincing arguments on all sides.  Some emphasise the loss of trade links if Brexit occurred, while others highlight the policy areas which could be brought back under British control. Polls conducted on the British public still vary wildly from day to day and many remain undecided.

 Many people worry about the risks of staying in the EU related to refugees and the Eurozone crisis, whereas the situation for the UK without the EU is equally uncertain.

 

Note: The opinions expressed in this post are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UCL, SSEES, or SSEES Research Blog

by Eline Groholt, IMESS Politics and International Economy Student 

Sometimes described as an ideal model for EU-British relations, at other times used as scare tactics of how bad it could get, Norway’s relation to the EU provides an interesting comparison for Great Britain’s options in the event of Brexit.

 

With 80 per cent of Norwegian exports and 60 per cent of imports coming from the EU, Norway is obliged to accept EU rules and regulations in order to access the common market, but is exempted with regards to important sectors such as agriculture and fishery. Norway adopts about three quarters of all EU legislation, without the right to vote on, or influence the law making process, except from being consulted in the initial stage of the process. Would Great Britain be ready to give up the right to influence legislation it is bound to follow?

 

Interestingly enough, the Norwegian government is backing the British remain campaign, although not itself a member. Following the two EU referenda in 1972 and 1994, Norway voted by a narrow margin to stay outside the EU, but remained within the European Economic Area (EEA) together with Iceland and Liechtenstein (EFTA members). As a former Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs declared to The Guardian: “the EEA has become Norway’s compromise on Europe.” If Great Britain followed the Norwegian model, it would severely alter the power balance of the EEA itself.

 

However, as the British referendum on the EU is approaching, British politicians supporting the “Vote Leave” campaign have become increasingly reluctant to picture the Norwegian model as an ideal option. In fact, it is becoming more and more evident what this option would actually involve, which threats British sovereignty would face and how the country would see undermined its role in the whole Europe.

Having voted ‘no’ twice, the Norwegian EU debate has been declared dead, leading to a lack of discussion, debate, healthy political conversation, and consequently, poor knowledge of EU political decision-making mechanisms and policies in general. Paradoxically, this happens at the same time as Norway becomes more closely integrated with the EU. A British referendum on the EU has at least sparked a vibrant debate in Britain on how the EU actually works. This should be welcomed.

 

Norway as a model for UK? So close, yet so far!

Although an interesting idea to ponder, the vast differences between the two countries make for a strange comparison. Norway is a small, resource exporting country with five million people belonging to Europe’s periphery, whereas Great Britain is a huge service economy with global ambitions and a world leading financial centre. It is hard to imagine a country like UK giving up influencing powers over EU legislation. And as EU scepticism continues to grow across Europe, perhaps a reluctant member like UK is exactly what the EU needs in order to modernise.

 

Note: Views expressed are those of the author, and not necessarily those of SSEES, UCL, or SSEES Research Blog

 

by Sultan Orazbayev – Current PhD Candidate

Research shows that visa restrictions between countries reduce scientific collaboration of researchers in those countries. If Brexit results in an increase in the administrative barriers to mobility, then this could harm the global standing of British-based researchers and British universities.

 

Recent comparative study of European and US researcher mobility documents that researchers in Europe (including non-EU countries) move less frequently within Europe compared to inter-state mobility of US researchers (Kamalski and Plume, 2013). The same study shows that countries with higher rates of mobility are associated with high-impact research. Additional supporting evidence on the importance of researcher mobility can be found in the recent Parliamentary report on EU membership and UK science.

There is no clear understanding of how Brexit will affect the administrative barriers to mobility, both for UK researchers’ access to EU countries and access to UK by EU researchers. A close case study is provided by Switzerland, see a detailed examination in a blog post by Galsworthy and Davidson (2015). In the extreme case of imposition of ‘paper walls’, for example travel visa requirements between UK and EU, there is likely to be a significant drop in UK-EU scientific collaborations and knowledge flows. This would exacerbate the impact of the reduction in overall funding of UK science which is likely to follow Brexit.
Research shows that higher ‘paper walls’ between countries (immigration policy, travel visa requirements) reduce bilateral knowledge flows and collaborations (Orazbayev, 2016). EU researchers are collaborators for about 40% of the UK collaborative research, thus even a small increase in collaboration costs is likely to lead to a sizeable drop in joint projects.

As a consequence of the negative impact of Brexit on UK (and EU) science, British universities would slide down in the global university rankings. International university league tables place a significant weight on research performance of a university, which is proxied by the citations to work generated at the university. For example, QS World University Rankings places 20% weight on citations per faculty as a measure of research impact. The decrease in citations to UK research (reflecting reduced knowledge flows), especially to the recent research, will push British universities down the league tables.

 

Please note: Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect those of UCL, SSEES or SSEES Research Blog

 

Chiara Amini – Teaching Fellow in Economics and Business and Raphael Espinoza – Lecturer in Economics
UCL SSEES Centre for Comparative Studies of Emerging Economies

It is a common view that a UK exit from the European Union would cause significant damage to the UK and to the EU.  The Treasury claims that Brexit would make Britain significantly poorer and could result in GDP contracting by as much as 6%. Such a significant impact would not be so surprising, given that trade and investment between the UK and Europe has grown significantly in the last 40 years. In 2014 a study by Ottaviano et al showed that Brexit trade losses would amount to 3.6% of UK GDP, as a result of an increase in taxes, quotas and regulatory legislation. What’s really striking is the fact that these losses have the potential of reaching 10% of GDP, if we consider the dynamic effect of trade on innovation and competition. Earlier this year, JPMorgan estimated that Brexit could reduce GDP growth by as much as 1% between 2016-17. At the same time the bank also warned that Brexit could decrease Eurozone GDP by 0.2-0.3%.

Policymakers in the EU countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been vocal in expressing their concerns about Brexit. The countries this specifically refers to are: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Recently Poland’s President, Andrzej Duda, warned that Brexit could have dramatic consequences for the Polish economy. However, formal analyses estimating the impact of Brexit on the region number on the fingers of one hand. Erste Bank argues that direct economic consequences on the region would be relatively minor as UK trade amounts to only 3-6% of total trade. However, countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, that run trade surpluses with the UK, are predicted to be most affected. After looking at the macro data, we can argue that Central and Eastern Europe would not only be affected by Brexit directly via a fall in flows from the UK, in terms of migration and remittances, trade and financial flow, but also indirectly through its effect on the Eurozone. As economic shocks spread easily from one country to another, a phenomenon known as ‘financial contagion,’ the impact of Brexit on the Eurozone would further reduce inflows to Central and Eastern Europe.

 

Financial flows from the UK to Central and Eastern Europe appear moderate (see Figure 1).  The median of UK financial flows to GDP is less than 1%.  Trade flows (import and export) are much more important, and they represent around 2.5% of GDP in Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 1– Median Flows UK- Central and Eastern Europe

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

However, taken together, UK trade and financial flows make up a sizeable share of the total flows to the region.  The proportion of UK remittances to total remittances in Central and Eastern Europe is as high as 8%. As far as trade is concerned, this ratio is 4%. Inevitably, some countries in the region have even stronger links with the UK; for instance, in the Czech Republic, foreign direct investment from the UK constitutes 14% of its total foreign direct investment.  Also in the Czech Republic, bank loans from the UK represent 2.5% of GDP. UK remittances also constitute an important part of total remittances sent to Latvia and Lithuania, over 20% of the total.

Moreover there has been a high degree of correlation in the economic growth between Central and Eastern Europe and the UK. This could be the result of financial contagion via other, third party countries. Alternatively, it could stem from both regions’ high integration with the two largest world economies, the US and the Eurozone.  However, the correlation between growth in Central and Eastern Europe and the UK (at 0.56) is higher than that between the US and Central and Eastern Europe. (0.43, see Figure 2) Disentangling such correlations so as to understand how economic shocks are transmitted between countries has been done in a variety of models.

 

Figure 2 – Real GDP growth (Year-on-Year; source: OECD and IMF)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Our analysis shows that the UK is a significant source of financial contagion for Central and Eastern Europe. If, as a pessimistic example, estimated by PwC earlier this year, UK GDP fell by 5% as a consequence of Brexit, this would reduce GDP growth in Central and Eastern Europe by no less than 2.5%, as a consequence of third party financial contagion. Since the model is linear, if the fall in UK GDP was only 1%, the impact on Central and Eastern Europe would be only 0.5%.

 

Historically, shocks to UK GDP have contributed around 20 % of the variance in growth in Central and Eastern Europe. In our research for this piece, we employed a well-known statistical methodology, Vector Auto Regression, to examine how growth in Central and Eastern Europe relates to the economic performance of the UK, US and Europe. The historical decomposition of growth in Central and Eastern Europe (Figure 3) attributes the good performance of Central and Eastern Europe in the first decade of this century to strong growth in the UK. This occurred at a time when growth in the Eurozone was disappointing.   

Figure 3. Historical decomposition on GDP growth in Central and Eastern Europe (YoY)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

We have come to the conclusion that, although it is uncertain what the short-term impact of Brexit on the UK will be, there are good reasons to think that it will have negative repercussions on Central and Eastern Europe.

 

Please note: Views expressed are those of the author(s) and not those of SSEES, UCL or SSEES Research Blog.

 

 

By Dr Sean Hanley – Senior Lecturer in Comparative Central and East European Politics

This post reproduced with author’s permission

 

A powerful coalition of forces – ranging from the driest of conservatives to Greens and the radical left and taking in big business,  trade unions, churches and universities – has come together to underline the negative economic, social and political consequences of Brexit.

The UK leaving the EU, it is argued, will not only do lasting damage the country’s economic prospects and political influence, but could have wider repercussions and might even  cause the Union to start unravelling.

This is not simply a matter of absorbing a mighty economic shock, the complexities of negotiating the terms of Brexit, or the umpredictable effects of a sharply changed balance of forces within a downsized Union – the greater weight of Eurozone vis-a-via the non-Eurozone, for example – but the new political dynamics that might take hold.

Some have argued that, emboldened by the example of Brexit, eurosceptics across the EU, will start to push for the exit option, triggering a kind of ‘domino effect’.  Writing for France Inter. Bernard Guetta gloomily takes for granted that post-Brexit

… so many politicians and political parties would follow headlong down this route to get a slice of the action. The pressure for similar referendums would arise all over Europe. The defenders of the European ideal would find themselves on the defensive. In such a crisis it would be very difficult to rebuild the EU.

Available evidence does suggest potential for such a process.  Polling by Ipsos Mori shows high public demand for referendums on EU membership in with significant minorities France (41%), Sweden (39%) and Italy (48%). favouring withdrawal. Other polling even suggested that post-Brexit a majority of Swedes would support exiting the EU.

French, Dutch and Danish electorates do have experience of rejecting EU treaties in referendums – with voters in the Netherlands getting further practice in last month’s referendum on EU-Ukraine trade deal, whichsome see a dry run for a Nexit vote.

And demands for exit from the EU – or referendums about it – have been raised by expanding parties of the populist right pushing their way towards power: Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party in Holland advocates Nexit, while French Front National plans to organise a referendum on Frexit within six months of coming to power.

FN leader Marine Le Pen, who relishes the idea of becoming Madame Frexit, also recommends that every EU member should have one (although her offer to visit the UK and help out the Brexit campaign has been abruptly turned down).

The Danish People’s Party, once regarded as on the radical right, but now considered respectable and modernised enough to sit with the British Tories in the European Parliament, is pondering the idea of pushing for a referendum Dexit (Daxit?).

The logic of such exit options among richer states seems to similar the case now being made by UK Brexiteers: that wealthy West European states might be economically strong enough to make it – and perhaps even thrive – in (semi-) detached relationship with (what remains of) the EU, trading economic some losses for sovereignty and the freedom to follow immigration and welfare policies tailored to national requirements.

Domino effect

There even been reports that some Central and East European countries might be in the line to exit the Union they joined little over a decade ago. In February Czech Republic’s deputy minister for European Affairs, Tomáš Prouza, told reporters that Brexit could push Czexit onto the political agenda for his country’s eurosceptic conservatives and hardline  Communists.

And to some extent he has a point.  Czechia’s mercurial President Miloš Zeman, although himself a eurofederalist firmly in favour of EU membership, thinks Czech voters should have their say in a Czexit referendum. The Czech parliament recently voted to discuss a resolution on a Czexit referendum proposed by the populist Dawn grouping (but ran out of parliamentary time to do so).

Despite this Mr Prouza and his boss Czech prime minister Bohuslav Sobotka were probably laying on the Brexopocalypse rhetoric rather too thick. Having flirted with rejection of EU membership in the to accession in 2004, both the conservative Civic Democrats (ODS) and Communists had reconciled themselves to membership of Union, while hoping to steer it in a political direction more in tune with their visions of European integration and Czech statehood some time in the future.

And, while there is plenty of scepticism about the EU across the CEE region – polls, for example, show a majority of Czechs deeply sceptical about the future of the European project and opposed to the adopting the Euro – as in Western Europe ‘hard euroscepticism’ has been the province parties of the radical right and left. It is hard to find any out-and-out outers in the region.

For poorer, economically less robust newer member states EU membership was not only the best option for economic development, but a civilisational choice confirming their ‘Return to Europe’ and status as fully fledged democracies.

And while the Brexit referendum is a contest between two (semi-)plausible futures both of which draw high levels of public support – centring a debate over the trade-offs between economic growth and recovered sovereignty – CEE states have no credible economic options outside the Union.

For this reason, ‘hard’ Eurosceptics in the region have often been big on critique and vision but quiet on concrete proposals for getting their countries out of the Union. Instead their implicit hope seems to be that eurosceptic and anti-federalist coalitions prepared to roll back integration – either between governments or parties – will emerge, or that the European Union would suffer a sudden collapse, leaving CEE societies, as in 1918, to make a break for national independence amid the rubble.

 

(more…)

By Filipa Figueira

As the Brexit debate rages throughout the UK, British people are clamoring for “facts” to help them decide. Yet neutral facts on the EU referendum seem hard to come by. “All I hear is opinions, but I want facts” scream, tweet and facebook the masses. So why are they not being given those?

The answer is that, when it comes to what will happen after the EU referendum, there are no facts …only forecasts. No-one can predict the future, and therefore no-one can tell what the economic growth rate of the UK will be if it leaves the EU, how many jobs (if any) will be lost, or what will happen to your grocery bill.

Economists will gladly provide you with estimates, but those are, well, estimates. Any minor change in the economic model used can produce a significantly different result, so it is no wonder that radically different numbers are being branded about, depending on the economist’s side of the campaign.

One of the key arguments of pro-Brexit advocates is precisely the difficulty that the average person has in understanding the EU. “Brussels” is seen as a mysterious labyrinth of hidden complexity, which cannot be understood – and therefore, cannot be trusted – by most Brits.

If may be of little comfort for them to hear that the EU labyrinth is hard to understand even for the EU officers who run it and for the EU scholars who study it. The EU is a moving target, a constantly changing animal, an entity forever evolving through what is known as the process of “Europeanisation”.

Europeanisation is any transformation that occurs because of the EU. This includes countries adapting their institutions to better deal with the EU, or to attract more EU funding. It also includes people feeling more European when they cooperate with other European countries – a process to which the UK appears staunchly impervious. And yes, it may include an increase in the scope of policymaking at EU level (reductions in that scope do happen as well, and can be called “de-Europeanisation”).

This is a constant process, and one which is by nature difficult to measure and define. The vast academic literature on Europeanisation struggles with this task, and usually ends up focusing on the more …academic question of defining what they mean by “Europeanisation”. Such a question can be endlessly debated, leaving academics with little time to actually research and clarify Europeanisation itself.

Could the Remain side argue that the undeniable complexity of Europeanisation is a point in its favor? Probably not. The leavers have it on this one. The question becomes, then, whether the added complexity is a worthwhile trade-off for the benefits of EU membership.

The public will not get facts on this – only those pesky forecasts – so they will need to use their brains. Why are all other European countries happy to put themselves through the

ambivalence and immeasurability of the EU labyrinth? Why is the debate about how many jobs will be lost after a Brexit, rather than about how many jobs will be gained?

An assessment based on common sense, rather than “facts”, shows where the trade-off lays. Europeanisation brings with it complexity and a loss of sovereignty on some policy areas. But on the other hand, it offers significantly better economic conditions and geopolitical clout, and spares the British economy from an (impossible to estimate) “uncertainty shock”.

As with any trade-off in life, the solution lies in finding the right balance. Clearly Brits do not wish to give away all their sovereignty, but neither do they wish to ruin their economy or face geopolitical isolation. So here is how things stand.

The current trade-off which the EU is offering involves a small loss in sovereignty (Britain retains control over all its key policies and all but a tiny percentage of its finances) in exchange for significant economic gains (being part of, and a key decision-maker within, the Single Market) and geopolitical benefits (being part of the continent’s decision-making, while remaining the United States’ most valued ally cum Trojan horse).

Will continuing Europeanisation disrupt this balance? That seems unlikely. A clear gap has emerged at EU level. On one side are the countries which are members of the Euro currency, and willing to accept deeper integration to guarantee its financial survival. On the other side are those, including the UK, which have decided to stay outside the Eurozone, and are clearly staying out of that process.

The only true result which David Cameron got out of his Brussels “renegotiation” was a guarantee that the UK could stay out of, and be unaffected by, that process (in fact that agreement was being discussed anyway, and would have been achieved with or without a “renegotiation” – but let us leave the Prime Minister’s theatrics out of this important discussion).

Europeanisation is, therefore, clearly moving towards a two-speed rhythm. Fast and bumpy for Eurozone members; slow and comfortable for more independent-minded countries such as the UK.

The trade-off on offer is a positive one for Britain, and about to get even better.

Whatever the result of the EU referendum, academics will carry on forever defining Europeanisation. Let us hope that Britain will still be a part of it.

Note: This article gives the views of the author(s), and not the position of the SSEES Research blog, nor of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, nor of UCL