The main party manifestos have now been published, allowing exploration and comparison of their constitutional proposals. In this second post in a series on the manifestos, Meg Russell looks at the parties’ commitments on parliamentary reform. What are they promising, and what are the prospects for these proposed changes? 

Yesterday on this blog, Lisa James reviewed the constitutional proposals presented by the political parties in their 2024 general election manifestos. Unsurprisingly, parliamentary reform is a key area that appears in several of them. Most parties include aspirations to reform the House of Lords, and some make other commitments on the House of Commons, or the overall power of parliament. This second post in the Constitution Unit’s manifesto series reviews these proposals, reflecting on their origins, merits, and prospects for implementation. It starts with the power of parliament as a whole, before moving to the Commons, and then the Lords. 

The power of parliament 

It is primarily the Liberal Democrats that give space to parliament’s overall place in the constitution – an area subject to significant recent controversy. The Brexit referendum of 2016 led to fierce clashes in parliament, and unusually high-profile arguments about both parliamentary procedure and the limits of the government’s prerogative power. Brexit also raised new questions about parliament’s powers over policy matters that returned to the UK following its exit from the European Union. 

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Recent events have led to renewed discussion about the convention that parliament should have a formal role in authorising military action, which Keir Starmer at one point proposed to codify in legislation. Robert Hazell argues that placing the existing convention on a statutory footing is unwise, and calls on parliament and the government to work together in creating a ‘shared vision’ of how the convention should operate.

Tony Blair’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has cast a long shadow over every subsequent leader of the Labour party. Keir Starmer opposed the Iraq war, and one of ten pledges he promised as part of his 2020 leadership campaign was to introduce a Prevention of Military Intervention Act. He subsequently specified on The Andrew Marr Show: ‘I would pass legislation that said military action could be taken if first the lawful case for it was made, secondly there was a viable objective and thirdly you got the consent of the Commons’.

Starmer was reminded of this pledge when he was interviewed about the UK airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. He told Laura Kuenssberg on 14 January that his proposal for military action to require the support of the Commons only meant sustained military action involving troops on the ground, rather than targeted airstrikes like those in the Red Sea:

If we are going to deploy our troops on the ground, then parliament should be informed: there should be a debate, the case should be made, and there should be a vote… What I wanted to do was to codify the convention: the Cabinet Manual has a convention… it could be in a law or it could be by some other means.

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Two years after the publication of the government’s Online Harms white paper, the government has published its final consultation response. Its commitment in the white paper to legislate to prevent online harms to democracy has disappeared, to the frustration of many inside and outside parliament. Alex Walker reflects on the government’s decision to ‘abandon the field’ and argues that a laissez-faire approach could lead to negative consequences.

It is expected that the Queen’s Speech on 11 May will include the government’s long-awaited Online Safety Bill. This will be a major piece of legislation with significant implications for the regulation of digital technology companies in the UK. However, when it is introduced it now seems highly unlikely that it will encompass measures to prevent harms to democracy, as was initially indicated.

The Online Harms white paper published in April 2019 set out a position that recognised the dangers that digital technology could pose to democracy and proposed measures to tackle them. This was followed by an initial consultation response in February 2020 and a full response in December. In the course of the policy’s development, the democracy aspect of the proposals has disappeared. The government now points instead to other areas of activity. This represents a shift away from the ambition of the white paper, which promised to address online harms ‘in a single and coherent way.’

Online Harms white paper: April 2019

The white paper first put forward the government’s intention for a statutory duty of care that would make companies responsible for harms caused on their platforms. This would include illegal harmful content, such as child abuse and terrorist material, but also some forms of harmful but legal content, including disinformation and misinformation. The white paper explicitly framed some of its proposals for tackling online harms in relation to the consequences for democracy. It detailed some of the harms that can be caused, including the manipulation of individual voters through micro-targeting, deepfakes, and concerted disinformation campaigns. It concluded that online platforms are ‘inherently vulnerable to the efforts of a few to manipulate and confuse the information environment for nefarious purposes, including undermining trust’. It recognised that there is a distinction to be drawn between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation.

The white paper also set out what the government expected to be in the regulators’ Code of Practice, and what would be required to fulfil the duty of care. This included: using fact-checking services, particularly during election periods; limiting the visibility of disputed content; promoting authoritative news sources and diverse news content; and processes to tackle those who misrepresent their identity to spread disinformation. It stated that action is needed to combat the spread of false and misleading information in part because it can ‘damage our trust in our democratic institutions, including Parliament.’

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On 21 January Unit Director Meg Russell appeared on a panel with two former Conservative Chief Whips, reflecting on Boris Johnson’s troubled relationship with parliament as Prime Minister. In this post she presents her central arguments – that the Johnson government in its early months has seemed to demonstrate some basic misunderstandings about parliament and its role; but also the government’s behaviour has highlighted some of parliament’s key weaknesses.

In early September 2020 I wrote a blogpost on Boris Johnson and parliament, which documented 13 unhappy episodes in 13 months. I had originally aimed at producing a list of 10 such episodes, but found that there was just too much material. Some of the incidents were obvious – such as the attempted prorogation the previous September, ultimately ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court. Others have continued to bubble along unhappily in the subsequent months – including the persistent refusal by Leader of the House of Commons Jacob Rees-Mogg to provide time for MPs to debate and agree proposals from the Procedure Committee to allow them to work virtually during the pandemic (frequently covered on this blog – see here and here), and the sporadic suggestions from government sources that the House of Lords should move to York. Some incidents were more obscure, but worth recalling for the record – such as Downing Street’s attempt to impose Chris Grayling as chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee (which rather dramatically backfired).

Of course that post was written five months ago, and the list continues to gets longer. It predated, for example, the dramatic showdown with former Conservative leaders over the government’s Internal Market Bill. It predated the announcement of the new Christmas lockdown rules during Commons recess, and the government’s refusal to allow a recall to debate them – despite protests by numerous Conservative backbenchers. It noted Johnson’s excessive first round of Lords appointments, but not his second within six months – both in clear breach of the Lord Speaker’s hardfought attempts to control the size of the chamber. It predated Johnson’s overruling of the House of Lords Appointments Commission’s recommendations on propriety, for the first time by any Prime Minister in the Commission’s 20-year existence.

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The latest edition of Monitor, the Unit’s regular news update on constitutional issues, was published today. In this lead article from Monitor 76, Meg Russell and Alan Renwick discuss the key events and themes of  the past four months. They include tensions between devolved and central govermnent related to Brexit and COVID-19; concern about parliamentary scrutiny of the pandemic; criticism of the government’s commitment to the rule of law (called into question by the UK Internal Market Bill, the Faulks review and criticism of the legal profession); the Russia report and other concerns about the country’s electoral framework; and the reshaping of government and civil service operations by Number 10.

England entered a new COVID-19 ‘lockdown’ just before Monitor went to press. The pandemic continues to dominate politics in the UK and globally, with a return to politics-as-usual appearing distant. Both the handling of the crisis and the government’s latest actions on Brexit have been key factors driving serious concerns about the maintenance of constitutional norms in the UK. But as this latest Monitor catalogues, the roots of those concerns – about declining respect for conventions and deliberate or accidental erosion of ‘checks and balances’ – are now spread across many fields.

There was tolerance in the early stages of the pandemic for quick decision-making, and partial bypassing of parliament. But that has increasingly grown thin. The UK is one of many countries where concerns have been expressed about COVID facilitating an executive ‘power grab’. Worldwide, experts have warned that ‘democracy, human rights and the rule of law cannot be allowed to become the collateral damage of the pandemic’. Most key decisions at UK level have come via secondary legislation, often published at short notice with little or no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny. Increasing protests from MPs, parliamentary committees and the Commons Speaker (see page 5) extracted concessions from ministers that parliamentary oversight would increase – hence the difficult vote on the new lockdown arrangements on 4 November. A total of 34 Conservative MPs voted against the new regulations – which represents almost half of the government’s working majority – and others abstained; though the measure passed comfortably with Labour support. A concerted cross-party approach from the start might have been sensible, but can be uncomfortable for ministers, particularly when accompanied by internal party dissent.

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