Mark Sandford argues that devolution within England offers a means of improving policy outcomes with minimal additional cost, but notes that the detailed practicalities of it will have as much effect on its outcome as declarations regarding new powers. He therefore suggests that changes in governance practice should be a core focus of future research initiatives.

Alongside debates on Scotland and Wales, English devolution was described by Christopher Harvie in 1991 as ‘the dog that never barked’. At the end of 2023, it has very rapidly become everyone’s pet. Both Labour and the Conservatives favour more devolution to local areas in England. Think tank reports extolling its likely economic benefits abound. Hardly any voices can be found making the case for pausing or reversing the government’s drive towards devolving power.

Far less attention has been devoted to examining the practicalities of achieving this end. It is easy to assume that ‘more devolution’ can be legislated into existence, with legal powers regarded as the lodestone of ‘real change’. This post suggests that devolution – expanding the scope of local decision-making within England – depends less on legislative changes and more on a transformation of the machinery of government at a local level. In this regard, developments in 2023 give unexpected grounds for optimism (see a summary of developments in 2023 on the House of Commons Library website). New ideas and practices of government are beginning to percolate into the English devolution agenda – and these can erode tacit assumptions that underlie the centralising tendencies within the British state.

This blog highlights the makings of new machinery of government practices in two aspects of English devolution: central-local relations and the role and scope of devolved institutions. Encouraging alternative governing practices has long been amongst the core rationales for devolving power: not just localised government, but better government. However, this blog also highlights a third dimension of English devolution acknowledged by government publications: accountability and scrutiny, where more enduring conceptual obstacles have yet to be tackled.

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Two years after the publication of the government’s Online Harms white paper, the government has published its final consultation response. Its commitment in the white paper to legislate to prevent online harms to democracy has disappeared, to the frustration of many inside and outside parliament. Alex Walker reflects on the government’s decision to ‘abandon the field’ and argues that a laissez-faire approach could lead to negative consequences.

It is expected that the Queen’s Speech on 11 May will include the government’s long-awaited Online Safety Bill. This will be a major piece of legislation with significant implications for the regulation of digital technology companies in the UK. However, when it is introduced it now seems highly unlikely that it will encompass measures to prevent harms to democracy, as was initially indicated.

The Online Harms white paper published in April 2019 set out a position that recognised the dangers that digital technology could pose to democracy and proposed measures to tackle them. This was followed by an initial consultation response in February 2020 and a full response in December. In the course of the policy’s development, the democracy aspect of the proposals has disappeared. The government now points instead to other areas of activity. This represents a shift away from the ambition of the white paper, which promised to address online harms ‘in a single and coherent way.’

Online Harms white paper: April 2019

The white paper first put forward the government’s intention for a statutory duty of care that would make companies responsible for harms caused on their platforms. This would include illegal harmful content, such as child abuse and terrorist material, but also some forms of harmful but legal content, including disinformation and misinformation. The white paper explicitly framed some of its proposals for tackling online harms in relation to the consequences for democracy. It detailed some of the harms that can be caused, including the manipulation of individual voters through micro-targeting, deepfakes, and concerted disinformation campaigns. It concluded that online platforms are ‘inherently vulnerable to the efforts of a few to manipulate and confuse the information environment for nefarious purposes, including undermining trust’. It recognised that there is a distinction to be drawn between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation.

The white paper also set out what the government expected to be in the regulators’ Code of Practice, and what would be required to fulfil the duty of care. This included: using fact-checking services, particularly during election periods; limiting the visibility of disputed content; promoting authoritative news sources and diverse news content; and processes to tackle those who misrepresent their identity to spread disinformation. It stated that action is needed to combat the spread of false and misleading information in part because it can ‘damage our trust in our democratic institutions, including Parliament.’

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