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This week sees the publication of Anthony Seldon and Tom Egerton’s new book, The Conservative Effect 2010-2024: 14 Wasted Years?. The book reviews the record of the Conservative Party in government across various topics. Constitution Unit Director Meg Russell contributed the book’s chapter on ‘Government, Parliament and the Constitution’, and summarises it here. 

A sustained period of Conservative government would normally be expected to usher in constitutional stability. But the reverse applied to most of the period 2010-24. During this time constitutional controversies were rarely far from the news, partly due to deliberately planned changes, but more often to radically shifting conventions and political behaviour. The direction of change was also very far from consistent. The initial coalition period primarily saw pressures towards greater constitutional pluralism, though Liberal Democrat ambitions were often held back by Cameron’s Conservatives. Later, any prospect of calm under single-party government was quickly punctured by Brexit, which eventually brought into question almost every aspect of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Boris Johnson’s populist approach, in particular, was characterised by wholesale disregard for constitutional norms.  

In 2012 Philip Norton emphasised that Conservative traditions valued constitutional conventions, parliament, and a strong government tempered by checks and balances, and might contemplate change that would ‘maintain, not destroy, the system’. This suggests that, if one commonality can be discerned across the 2010-24 period of constitutional extremes, it is its largely unconservative nature. 

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The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a number of constitutional policy commitments – on Brexit, UK institutions, elections, civil liberties, and devolution. As the manifestos for this year’s general election emerge, Lisa James assesses the delivery record of the 2019–24 Conservative governments against the pledges made in 2019. 

The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a wide-ranging set of constitutional commitments. Since its publication much has changed – the UK has left the EU, experienced a global pandemic, and had three Prime Ministers and five Chancellors of the Exchequer. But delivery against manifesto commitments still matters, so with the 2019–24 parliament dissolved, now is the time to reassess the pledges that were made. 

Getting Brexit done 

The single highest profile – and titular – pledge of the manifesto was of course the promise to ‘get Brexit done’. The election followed a period of parliamentary deadlock, and the negotiation of Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal. The manifesto pledged to pass this deal, limit the length of the ‘transition period’ for negotiating new trade arrangements, end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the UK, and end the supremacy of EU law. 

The Brexit deal was rapidly passed following the Conservative general election victory, and the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. The pledge not to extend the transition period beyond the end of 2020 was also kept. The deal largely removed ECJ jurisdiction from the UK, but the court retained a continuing role in relation to Northern Ireland as a result of its treatment under Johnson’s Brexit deal (discussed further below). The supremacy of retained EU law (a special category of legislation derived from the UK’s EU membership) was ended by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. 

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The surprise general election may leave many suddenly nostalgic for the principle of fixed-term parliaments. The original central arguments for fixed terms have been reawakened. In this post, Meg Russell and Robert Hazell revisit these long-standing arguments, summarise the birth and death of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, and argue that – on the basis of UK and international experience – we should consider returning Westminster to fixed terms. 

The lengthy and debilitating speculation about when Rishi Sunak might call the general election may have reminded many of the arguments in favour of fixed-term parliaments. His shock announcement on 22 May that such an election would take place in July only reinforces those views. This blog post revisits the arguments for fixed terms, reminds readers of how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) was created and abolished, and argues for reintroduction of the principle of fixed terms – albeit with flexibility to allow early elections on occasion, as applies in many other democracies (and existed under the FTPA). 

The arguments for fixed-term parliaments 

The following is a summary of points in favour of the principle of fixed-term parliaments: 

• Allowing the government to decide the timing of elections provides an unjustified incumbency advantage. 
• It also confers disproportionate power on the executive over parliament. 
• A fixed election cycle is better for both civil service and electoral administration planning, and encourages more long-term thinking in government. 
• Fixed terms are also better for political parties, prospective parliamentary candidates, and the regulation of election spending. 
• Speculation about an early election may unnecessarily unsettle commercial and economic decisions. 
• Parliamentary business, including the work of select committees, can be planned and carried through with less risk of interruption.  

These are not our words; they are drawn (mostly verbatim) from the report of the cross-party parliamentary Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (paragraph 17), published in March 2021. Based on recent experience, some of them may now feel very familiar. 

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This month’s elections for mayors and police and crime commissioners were contested under a revised voting system. In a post published yesterday, Alan Renwick found that this change had a substantial impact on the results, to the benefit of the Conservatives. Here, he concludes that it also harmed democracy. 

Elections of mayors and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) were previously held under the Supplementary Vote (SV) system, where each voter could express first and second preferences. Now they take place using First Past the Post (FPTP), where there is a vote for a single candidate. The previous post in this series showed that this change produced a marked shift in the outcome of the elections held earlier this month, and that it did so entirely to the benefit of the Conservatives.  

That a change in the rules should favour those in power who instigated it is already cause for concern: democracy requires a level playing field. But ministers might defend the reform on the basis that the new system is superior on democratic grounds to its predecessor and that it was introduced fairly. Both of these claims therefore require interrogation. How do the two systems compare in terms of democratic quality? And was the process through which the change in voting system came about appropriate?  

Which voting system is more democratic? 

As I outlined in a blogpost published when the bill changing the voting system was before parliament in 2021, ministers argued that FPTP is the more democratic system: SV, they said, allows losing candidates – those coming second in terms of first preferences – to win. But this argument is circular: it works only if we have already accepted the FPTP definitions of ‘winner’ and ‘loser’.  

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