Policing in the Post-Colonial State: The Politics of Militarised Policing in Jamaica, 1962-1976

In this post, Jacob Bright, a student in the MA in Latin American Studies programme, writes about the research for his dissertation, which was awarded the Elsa Goveia prize for the best dissertation on the Caribbean. 

Policing in the Post-Colonial State: The Politics of Militarised Policing in Jamaica, 1962-1976 

 Jacob Bright 

Policing in Jamaica during the 1960s and 1970s was militarised and violent. This is usually attributed to political pressures, colonial legacies, and social failures: insecure leaders facing partisan competition, growing societal unrest, and threats to their authority turned to repression to maintain control. As revealed through my research in the National Archives, this history is, however, incomplete.  

Empire remained deeply entangled with Jamaica’s security long after independence in 1962. This was not colonial influence fading away, but an intentional policy that enabled convergence with British interests through training programmes, personnel exchanges, and the grooming of leadership. 

British officials worked to ensure Jamaican policing developed “along British lines”, maintaining regional influence and alignment on security priorities. Foreign powers, particularly Britain, wielded considerable influence over Jamaica’s security infrastructure through the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and Jamaica Defence Force (JDF). The JCF was formed in 1867 after the Morant Bay Rebellion and underwent little change over the following century. The JDF, created in 1962, was commanded by British officers until 1965, inheriting the structure, tactics, and repressive mentality of its imperial predecessor. Both remained institutional legacies of colonial control.  

Post-independence leaders saw little contradiction between sovereignty and inherited security structures, and there was a lack of political will to dismantle or reform them. Joint military-police operations continued as standard practice – the first act of the newly formed JDF was a joint training operation with the JCF. 

Police and military power became increasingly centralised under prime-ministerial control. After the 1963 Coral Gardens incident Prime Minister Bustamante was quoted in the Gleaner stating that all that mattered in utilising a joint military-police force was “my discretion, my authority”. The use of the military for domestic policing is central to understanding why violence and militarised politics escalated across the 1960s and 1970s. 

The JDF was not a traditional military force. Jamaica had few external threats; key allies secured the Caribbean, and the U.S. kept a watchful eye on the region. Facing little external threat, Jamaica’s leadership turned its military towards perceived internal insecurity. The 1963 Coral Gardens incident, the 1966 State of Emergency, the 1968 Rodney Riots, and the 1976 State of Emergency, were all prominent examples of the military being retooled for domestic policing.  

In these instances – and many others – the military, jointly with the police, violently suppressed threats to stability. Although the specific nature of internal threats differed during the governments of the Jamaica Labour Party (1962-1972) and People’s National Party (1972-1980), the method of response did not. The development of a militarised police force only sped up. 

This militarisation was not, however, only a result of these internal issues. Britain (and, to a lesser extent, the U.S.) maintained an active interest in Jamaica’s internal security long after independence. After 1962, Britain continued to exert influence, relying on “softer” tactics such as training programmes, international exchanges, and the grooming of Jamaican leadership. 

In 1967, Britain launched the British Police Training Mission (BPTM) in Jamaica. Its objectives included: increasing the joint operational capacity of the military and police, providing intelligence training “in accordance with briefs to be provided by the British Security Service”, and enhancing intra-imperial connections among security personnel. Britain led this initiative knowing that alignment was of significant value for ongoing regional power. It gave Britain influence at all levels of security, from new recruits to Commissioners. 

Britain also exercised soft influence through its military presence. This was maintained not only for the defence of its colonies, but also to aid in training opportunities for Jamaica – such as Operation Calypso Hop – and guard against the “constant risk of internal unrest” attributed to “Black Power and left-wing militants”.  

Within the Jamaican officer class, British officials engineered promotions and opportunities for favourable candidates. This included a successful multi-year campaign to push Rudolph Green from head of the 1st Jamaica Regiment to JDF Chief of Staff. Green was sent to observe colonial policing in Hong Kong and Singapore, placed on track for a prestigious training course at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and rivals were moved out of the way. 

This soft approach created channels for Britain to lean on Jamaica directly and indirectly. Militarism was understood to be “an integral part of a police officer’s duties” around the Commonwealth and remained a core part of British foreign policy. 

Certainly, the Jamaican government, due to its populist tendencies and insecure hold on power, cracked down on crime and threats to state authority – expanding the desire for a militarised policing force. Yet, this evidence suggests Britain was a primary driver in this process, encouraging militarism in the name of ‘stability’ and influence. 

 

Jacob Bright is a former master’s student at UCL’s Institute of the Americas (2024-2025). He holds an MA in Latin American Studies from the Institute of the Americas and a BA in History from the University of Warwick. Jacob plans to continue his research into Caribbean policing.