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Czech presidential election: the oligarch or the general?

By Sean L Hanley, on 20 January 2023

Czechs again seem set to reject populism for moderate steady-as-you-go leadership, leaving bigger reform debates for another day, argues Seán Hanley.

Brno pro Ukrajinu 2022-03-01 (3762b) Petr Pavel

Petr Pavel [Photo: Martin Strachoň, CC BY-SA 4.0]

On 13-14 January Czech voters went to the polls in record numbers to choose a new head of state to replace two-term president Miloš Zeman.   Although, as expected, none of the eight candidates gained enough support to win outright,  two clear frontrunners emerged to contest a second, run-off round on 27-28 January: former prime minister and billionaire businessman Andrej Babiš, who leads the  ANO movement – Czechia’s biggest political party – and independent retired general Petr Pavel, the ex-head of the Czech Army who had served  a high-ranking  NATO official in Brussels. Pavel narrowly topped the poll with 35.4 percent of the vote with Babiš narrowly trailing on 34.99 percent.

At first glance, the result looks puzzling. Voters in one of post-communist Central Europe’s most socially liberal democracies have opted for an unlikely-looking choice between an oligarch and a general.  Conventional party-political candidates and issues were largely absent from the campaign which centred on personalities, particularly, on the divisive figure of Babiš.  Opponents see the billionaire ex-PM, who was acquitted by a court of EU subsidy fraud in the long-running Storks Nest case mid-way through the campaign, as a corrupt populist with strong authoritarian leanings.

But the contest also reveals underlying continuities in Czech politics. Originally elected to parliament on an anti-corruption platform and promises to ‘run the state like a firm’, Babiš has long since shifted towards a loose social populism promising big public spending, generous pensions, and hikes in public sector salaries, which has seen him swallow up the electorate of Czechia’s once strong parties of the traditional left.

This was amply demonstrated in the first-round. Babiš promised to ‘help people’ and fend off belt tightening or taxes rises the current centre-right government may resort to cope with Czechia’s strained post-Covid public finances. Analysis of first round-voting patterns confirm that Babiš’s vote was strongest in poorer regions and smaller localities with lower  standards of living and educational attainment, and higher levels of unemployment and consumer debt. (more…)

Liberals against nationalism in Eastern Europe? It would have been a nice idea

By Sean L Hanley, on 25 July 2018

Protesters in Sofia standing on statue of a lion wave EU flag

Photo: Tourbillon [CC BY-SA 3.0 ]

Some commentators say East Central Europe’s liberals made the fatal mistake of cutting themselves off from traditional nationalism. Seán Hanley and James Dawson disagree.

Ivan Krastev  recently argued that East Central Europe’s liberals had made the error of taking an anti-nationalist stance from some point in the late 1990s. This, argued Krastev, occurred when the region’s liberals drew the lesson from the wars in the former Yugoslavia that all nationalism leads inevitably to bloodshed and violence.

By following the German example of avoiding public displays of flag-waving and treating nationalism as a creed that ‘dare not speak its name’, he claims, these liberals unwittingly forced moderate nationalists into the ‘illiberal camp’, opening the door for the illiberal backsliding that blights the region today.

This would be a compelling story – if it bore any resemblance to the actual behaviour of East Central European liberals in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

But it doesn’t. Anti-nationalism hasn’t been tried and failed in East Central Europe, it has never been tried.

In the 1990s, much as today, the most significant barrier to the realisation of an inclusive, pluralistic vision of liberal democracy was the taken-for-granted idea that the national state is the property of and instrument for titular national majorities. Both the EU and their liberal partners in Central and Eastern Europe knew this, yet both opted to accommodate ethnic nationalism at the time rather than oppose it. (more…)

SSEES research blog launches

By Sean L Hanley, on 23 October 2012

School of Slavonic and East European Studies

Photo: Steve Cadman via Wikicommons

The UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies has launched a new academic blog.

This is the inaugural post of a new blog written by academics and researchers at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London (UCL SSEES).  In the new SSEES Research blog we aim to provide accessible, high-quality analysis and discussion of Russia, Central, Eastern and South-East Europe and the Baltic, drawing on the  research expertise of SSEES specialists. The blog will cover all aspects of culture, economics, history, politics and societies of the region, as well as broader issues such as migration, diasporas and European identities.

Blogs are an increasingly important channel for bringing academic research and expertise to a wider audience and enhancing public debate. To this end, we aim to offer regular updated content written for the blog  from the full range of discplines at SSEES, as well as archiving some of the best writing by SSEES staff to appear elsewhere. Our first posts will appear tomorrow.

To learn more  please contact the blog’s editorial co-ordinator  Sean Hanley or simply follow us on Twitter at @SSEESResBlog.