Implications of Trump’s Foreign Policy

By Shuting Xia, on 3 March 2017

Written by Ahmed Elgen 

Photo credit:

Photo credit:

So, it has been a month since President Trump assumed office and, well, what a month it has been. It seems that the President not only wants to make the American military stronger, but the executive order archive larger. From rolling back Obamacare to demanding the construction of a 1,900-mile long wall along the border with Mexico, Trump has maintained his campaign rhetoric and is now translating it into White House action. Governments across the world will be analysing Trump’s policies to monitor whether the changes will have a positive or negative impact on them. Here’s my take on the US-China and US-Russia relationships moving forward.

To some in Beijing, Trump’s victory signals opportunity. A real estate billionaire with no prior political experience, taking the helm of the most powerful nation on earth – surely he’ll make a strategic error at some point?


Where Obama stands now: The Keystone XL pipeline

By Claire McNear, on 6 March 2014

By Aydan Sarikaya

An oil sands extraction plant in Alberta, Canada.

An oil sands extraction plant in Alberta, Canada.

The Keystone XL pipeline is and has been perhaps the most controversial environmental and energy debate for President Barack Obama’s administration in the United States. The proposed pipeline stretches from Alberta’s tar sands fields to the Gulf of Mexico. It would cross a number of states, laying 1,179 miles of pipeline through Saskatchewan, Montana, South Dakota, and Nebraska, and would connect to a series of existing pipeline segments in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. Ultimately, the pipeline would carry up to 830,000 barrels of heavy crude oil a day from Canada down to the southern United States. Because of the pipeline’s trans-boundary nature, the last 875 miles of the pipeline still need to be approved by the President, a decision he will base on the recently released Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) distributed by the State Department.

The EIS is a compilation of research done by a third party on the environmental impact of the extraction, transportation, and possible leaks of the heavy tar-like black oil, bitumen, one of the crudest forms of oil. The EIS raised no major environmental objections to the pipeline. However, the third party firm that conducted the EIS, Environmental Resources Management (ERM), is shrouded in controversy. Typically, an EIS is paid for by the applicant, in this case the energy company TransCanada, in order to avoid costs to taxpayers. TransCanada previously offered up a different third party to conduct the EIS, but it was found that there was a conflict of interest between the two, leading to ERM as the next viable candidate. Since then, news outlets including Bloomberg Businessweek, CNN, and the BBC have uncovered that ERM listed TransCanada in its promotional materials a year before beginning work on the EIS. In response to the controversy, the State Department, which awarded the EIS contract to ERM, has assured the public that ERM conducted an unbiased EIS. As it stands, the EIS is now open for a 90-day comment period, allowing other US agencies and the general public to raise their concerns.

The Keystone XL pipeline has created huge divides between environmentalists, politicians on both sides of the aisle, and energy companies. Extraction of tar sands oil requires one of the most environmentally detrimental procedures of any type of oil collection, involving the clearing of plants and churning of topsoil, leaving a barren landscape behind. Environmentalists worry that though the extraction is occurring on Canadian soil, a sign-off on the pipeline would encourage American oil and energy companies to begin tar sands oil production within the United States. Others see the potential for policy backpedaling or worse from President Obama, including Arizona House Democrat Raúl Grijalva, who wrote an op-ed for the New York Times reiterating that President Obama has consistently stressed the importance of strong policies on climate change and environmental preservation, beginning in his 2008 presidential campaign and carrying through to his most recent State of the Union address. The result, Grijalva argued, is that the Keystone XL pipeline may be the President’s most important decision related to the environment since arriving in office.

After years of delays, the Keystone XL pipeline proposal is on its way to approval by the State Department. After the 90-day comment period, a review of the Environmental Impact Statement may be made. Once that is completed, the EIS must be accepted by the State Department, leaving the final decision on approval of the pipeline to the President.

If the President wishes to maintain his reputation as a champion of green issues, then it is vital that he understand what opening a tar sands oil pipeline across the United States will mean for the future of the American oil industry. There are both costs and benefits related to environmental degradation, as well as the prospect of jobs and energy independence. Obama’s decision may affect Congressional elections as well as pave the way for tar sands oil production in the US. Oil extraction and climate change go hand in hand; the trouble is that there is more money in the oil industry than there is working toward mitigating climate change. Obama must consider the consequences carefully and decide how much he is willing to risk on one of the most important and controversial environmental decisions of his presidency.

Diplomacy for sale

By Jack Harris, on 4 March 2014

By Robert Johansen

Given America’s economic, military and political predominance, the somewhat careless manner in which the country chooses its representatives to the rest of the world should come as a surprise to many – though not, perhaps, their diplomatic counterparts. Many US ambassadors are not career diplomats, and are appointed by presidential fiat rather than through the roughly meritocratic procedures of the State Department. Barack Obama has been particularly fond of the practice, with over 35% of his ambassadorial appointees drawn from political allies.

Even the US Secretary of State has usually never been a career diplomat – the position is usually reserved for prominent politicians or generals. It could have been regarded as a stepping-stone to the executive office in the earlier half of the Republic. But, the appointee for Secretary of State is usually a member of the current president’s party, perhaps wisely so considering that the position is fourth in the line of presidential succession.

The President’s nominees have to be approved by the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, yet many past congressmen, party donors, and powerful business people get through with ease. Recent scandals have broken out over the appointment of ambassadors with questionable ability to function as liaison for the US. Colleen Bell, a soap-opera producer, was appointed to Hungary, apparently for the sole reason that she raised over $500,000 for Obama’s re-election campaign. Max Baucus, a former Senator from Montana, was chosen to serve in China, despite himself admitting that he was “no real expert” on the country. Cynthia Stroum, another top donor, proved so incompetent in her abortive tenure as ambassador to Luxembourg that several of her subordinates requested transfer to Iraq and Afghanistan, postings for which volunteers are normally few and far between. The most egregious failure at the recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee was George Tsunis, a hotel magnate, who was appointed to Norway, his unawareness that the country was a constitutional monarchy and his dismissal of the leading coalition party as a bigoted “fringe-element.” He had given almost $1 million to Obama’s re-election campaign.

To put the whole system in perspective, the Norwegian ambassador to the US has over 30 years experience in politics. The Hungarian Ambassador has worked 27 years at the International Monetary Fund. It is no coincidence that most of the politically appointed posts are in the Caribbean, Western Europe, or in countries with large trading relationships with the US. It is also no coincidence that the cushy spots in Italy or France were given to presidential campaign donors of about $1 million or more.

On the other hand, one can argue that an ambassador does not need to be a career diplomat, political expert, or economist to represent the interests of the United States. There is no particular training or career that can prepare an individual for the nuanced responsibilities of a diplomat. Few people are prepared to be an expert in the affairs, languages, and cultures of any specific country. Ambassadors are supported by the vast knowledge and expertise of the US Foreign Service to inform them of important negotiations and plan outreach events. Even flagrantly political appointees whose expertise is limited at best can rely on experienced teams to guide them through an unfamiliar maze of formalities, appearances, and politics.

Thankfully, these ambassadorial appointees are drastic aberrations from the norm. Over 60% are extremely qualified professional diplomats with a lifetime of experience in international affairs. Yet a willingness to treat senior diplomatic posts as sinecures to be doled out to favoured friends will not help to dispel perceptions of high-handedness in America’s relations with its allies. Any damage done by Obama’s appointees is unlikely to be long-lasting, yet at a time when America’s relations with its European allies in particular have been strained by the Snowden leaks and by divisions over foreign policy, the country might be well served by investing in a little goodwill.

The 2014 State of the Union: A new era of American restraint abroad?

By Claire McNear, on 29 January 2014

By Claire McNear

In last night’s State of the Union address, President Barack Obama appeared to signal the advent of a less aggressive American grand strategy, saying that the nation “must move off a permanent war footing.”

Arguing that American security “cannot depend on…military alone,” Obama said that he “will not send our troops into harm’s way unless it is truly necessary, nor will I allow [them] to be mired in open-ended conflicts.”

By all accounts, it’s been a tough year for Obama – he has faced intense scrutiny for everything from the NSA and PRISM revelations to the botched rollout of the Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare). The annual State of the Union address is a rare opportunity for the commander in chief to dictate conversation, and, to some extent, subsequent policy debate. For Obama, this might have been his last real chance to do so – by next January, national attention will have shifted to the contest for Obama’s successor (indeed, some are out of the gate early, however strangely). The 2015 speech will come nearly three months after the midterm elections, which is often when you start hearing the words “lame duck” murmured in dark Capitol corners.

State of the Union addresses typically focus largely on domestic affairs – and this one did, highlighting education issues and the financial recovery, with some of the night’s biggest applause coming after announcing a proposal to increase the federal minimum wage – though they can serve as a springboard for foreign policy. See, for instance, George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, which (in)famously laid out the so-called “Axis of Evil” – Iran, Iraq, and North Korea – which Bush credited, along with “their terrorist allies,” with “arming to threaten the peace of the world.” That speech served as a cornerstone of the philosophical justification of the War on Terror, and, a year later, of the US-sponsored invasion of Iraq.

Obama used last night’s speech to reinforce the idea of a new, quieter era of American foreign policy. In discussing Iran, which recently reached a short-term agreement with the international community to cease uranium enrichment in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions, Obama applauded the virtues of diplomatic negotiation over force. “For the sake of our national security, we must give diplomacy a chance to succeed,” he said, adding that the success of the Iranian agreement would mean the resolution of “one of the leading security challenges of our time without the risks of war.” Though much has happened (and not happened) since then, this is the same leader who said in 2007 that as president he would “engage in aggressive personal diplomacy” with Iran, and sit down with Iranian leaders (among others) without preconditions.

Still, Obama made a point last night of saying that there are limits to any diplomatic overtures – he will readily use force where American national security is threatened, and this may be the fatal flaw of any quieter strategy. “As commander in chief,” he said, “I have used force when needed to protect the American people, and I will never hesitate to do so as long as I hold this office.”

Protection of the American people remains a fuzzy objective; shortly after hinting at a new international reticence, Obama laid out a wide-ranging list of international items that will “help promote [America’s] long-term security,” among them democracy-building in Tunisia and Burma and support of American allies in the Asia-Pacific.

The latter goal has been a tricky one for the United States over the last year, as tensions flared between China, Japan, and South Korea. In 2011, the Obama Administration and State Department signaled a policy shift in the Asia-Pacific region: the United States would redouble its diplomatic efforts there (i.e. away from the Middle East), more or less as a response to Chinese economic and military growth. This strategy was originally referred to as a “pivot” to Asia, though government and military officials now use the softer “rebalance” instead, which some have worried signals a similar softening of commitment to Asian allies. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Sheila A. Smith was quick to note that last night’s State of the Union failed to address either a pivot or a rebalance – instead, she wrote, just plans to “continue to pursue American interests.”

Does Obama’s speech mean we will see a more restrained America? According to a recent Pew survey, an incredible 52% of Americans said they believe “that the US should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” (this number usually falls between 20 and 40%). Outright isolationism is rather unlikely, to put it mildly, but Obama seemed to understand that his audience last night was war-weary: he noted that all US troops have left Iraq, with another 60,000 back from Afghanistan.

American restraint is, perhaps, relative. Some 37,500 American troops remain in Afghanistan today along with a smaller cohort of NATO and other international partners; an agreement sent before Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai (which officials say he may well reject) would leave 10,000 American troops in the country after the end of this year, when the NATO mission officially concludes. And while the last US troops left Iraq in December 2011, the US Embassy in Baghdad retains a staff of nearly 6,000, and thousands more American contractors remain in the country.

Still, we can take President Obama’s speech as an indication that the United States of 2014 is serious about a commitment to diplomacy over force wherever possible. The recent diplomatic détente with Iran may come to be one of the greater foreign policy victories of the Obama White House. In his speech, Obama directly threatened Congressional Republicans, who have been making noise about disrupting the Iran negotiations by introducing a new sanctions bill. Obama’s eagerness to use diplomacy, coupled with an American public dreaming of an era of isolationism, could signal a new era of American restraint.

Also of note:

– Also mentioned was Guantanamo Bay, the United States’ 12-year-old exercise in illegal detention and public condemnation, with Obama calling for this to be the year that the prison is finally closed. The President promised to close the prison within a year of taking office in January 2009; 155 detainees remain imprisoned as of this month.

– Obama stopped just short of criticizing Russia for its recent anti-gay statements and policies. “[W]e believe in the inherent dignity and equality of every human being, regardless of race or religion, creed or sexual orientation,” he said. “And next week the world will see one expression of that commitment when Team USA marches the red, white and blue into the Olympic stadium and brings home the gold.” This received raucous applause, but seemed not to get quite where it meant to – Team USA’s official White House delegation, of which the President and First Lady will not be a part, features two openly gay athletes, Billie Jean King and Caitlin Cahow. As the delegation was personally selected by President Obama, their inclusion has been widely viewed as a rebuke of Russia, where President Vladimir Putin has urged gay visitors to “leave kids alone,” whilst the mayor of Sochi has declared that there are no homosexuals in the city. So we can see the latter bit of Obama’s comments as meant to be less about the glory of manly sports, and more about reminding his Russian counterpart that Team USA will be bringing along red, white, and blue as part of a wider spectrum.

Self-defense or Expansionism?

By Saskia Kok, on 5 January 2014

By Jack Harris

Relations amongst the nations surrounding the East China Sea have been marked by mutual suspicion and nervousness over the past few weeks. China declared a 200 kilometer wide band of sea around its coast to be an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), within which, China asserts, all foreign aircraft are obliged to identify themselves or face as yet unspecified defensive measures.

The zone and rules applied within it are hardly remarkable; Japan and the US have declared zones, ADIZ extending to barely 150 kilometers away from Chinese shores. However, the Chinese ADIZ encompasses islands claimed by Japan and South Korea, as well as slicing through bustling international shipping lanes that the US has made clear it does not want to see become the dominion of any one country. All three nations have reacted angrily, with both Japan and the US sending military jets through the ADIZ, where they were trailed by Chinese fighters.

The greatest cause for worry is not the zone itself but the broader strategy pursued by China in its territorial disputes over the past few years; China has rejected not just multilateral but even bilateral negotiation, in favour of unassailable declarations of absolute sovereignty backed up by economic coercion and vague military threats. Over the past few years, China has suspended exports to Japan of rare earths (vital for the country’s electronic industry) and harrassed Japanese factories operating in the country, while bellicose commentators employed by the semi-independent army have kept up a stream of vitriol against the country.

This strategy of essentially bullying neighbours into compliance with Chinese demands has predictably self-defeating: neighbours to the east and the south have begun cooperation in defence and foreign policy to a degree that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. Korea and Japan, whose relations have long been marred by lingering Korean bitterness over Japan’s occupation of the country in the 1930s, now find themselves united by a common interest in checking Chinese expansionism. Indonesia, Vietnam, and even India have begun to speak more overtly of security cooperation with Japan and with one another.

In other words, China seems to be risking becoming surrounded by a ring of hostile states, the scenario its leaders have long feared the most, for the sake of acquiring a few rocks (the population of the Senkakus consists solely of a few hundred seagulls) and placating domestic nationalists eager for a fight with Japan.

To understand this seemingly bizarre strategy, one has to appreciate the extent to which containment is viewed in China not as a possible future consequence of foreign policy mistakes but as a fait accompli. This narrative, one especially popular among the hawkish groups that dominate Chinese strategic circles, holds that all American action in the region, from its longstanding support for Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines to its recent rapprochements with Myanmar and Vietnam, is directed towards constraining and undermining China and preventing a challenge to its own global hegemony.

With such assumptions, China’s strategic priorities seem quite different; making concessions for the sake of stable relations with neighbouring states hardly seems a promising strategy if those neighbours are assumed to be working in concert to contain China. China’s ADIZ aggressive pursuit of other territorial claims conversely seem less like pointless antagonism and instead like an indispensable first step towards pushing back against an ever-tightening circle of American pawns.

This is significant because America’s response to the ADIZ and other instances of Chinese aggression – appealing to China’s better judgement and urging restraint – will simply not work if large swathes of China’s foreign policy community assume a priori that the US is both hostile and duplicitous. Unless some shift can be effected in the paranoid mindset of China’s leaders, the risk of conflict in the seas around China will continue to rise, as demonstrated earlier this week when a Chinese frigate almost rammed an American surveillance ship in the South China Sea.

The US and its allies are hardly in a position to transform China’s strategic assumptions, but America might hand some relief to the few beleaguered doves in China’s government by at least making its goals in Asia more explicit. Barack Obama’s administration continues to claim that its “pivot” to Asia is in no way directed at China, in a remarkable insult to the intelligence of the Chinese.

There are more open strategies that could be pursued. The US could lay down a firm principle of opposition to further military expansion by the PRC, while emphasizing that the US is not engaged in any attempt to bring about regime change in China (which it is certainly not, quite simply because it does not have the means to do so), placing defensive conflict prevention at the centre of its China policy.

Such a change in rhetoric will likely have little impact within China, but it could serve as the beginning of a much needed change of approach towards relations with China in the US and Europe: a greater focus on convincing China that it faces no coherent threat from the West, instead of wasting political capital on formalistic “criticism” of China’s human rights record. Only if Chinese fears can be abated can any significant shift towards stability in East Asia’s seas become a possibility.